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Justification Logic is the study of a family of logics used to reason about justified
true belief. Dynamic Epistemic Logic is the study of a family of logics obtained by
adding various kinds of communication to the language of multi-modal logic, yielding
languages for reasoning about communication and true belief. This paper is a first-step
in merging these two areas, in that it brings the most basic kind of communication
studied in Dynamic Epistemic Logic—the public announcement—over to Justification
Logic. This gives us a language for reasoning about public announcements and justified
true belief.
After giving an overview of Justification Logic, the paper introduces a notion of
bisimulation for Justification Logic. Bisimulation allows us to study the affect on
language expressivity when we add various kinds of communication to the language.
Among a number of expressivity results, we show that adding public announcements
to the language of Justification Logic strictly increases language expressivity. This
stands in contrast to the Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem, which states that adding public
announcements to multi-modal logic does not increase language expressivity. This leads
us to extend the language of Justification Logic in order to provide a Plaza-Gerbrandy
analog of multi-modal logic that we can use to reason about justified true belief.
1 Introduction
The predominant approach in formal epistemology defines knowledge using Kripke’s possible
world semantics [11]. This Kripke-knowledge is defined as having true (correct) belief. Here
belief is just Hintikka’s notion: I Hintikka-believe something exactly when that something is
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true in all of those states of affairs that look the same to me as the actual state of affairs [16].
And to say that the Hintikka-belief of p is true (as in correct) means that p is in fact true
in the actual state of affairs. So I Kripke-know something exactly when I Hintikka-believe
that something and I am correct in this belief.
Now if a formal language has a possible worlds semantics that makes true Hintikka-
belief expressible in the language, then this language can be used to reason about Kripke-
knowledge. The language of modal logic is an example: if K is a modal and ϕ is a formula,
then the modal formula Kϕ—read it as “ϕ is known”—expresses the true Hintikka-belief of
ϕ when we interpret this language via Kripke’s semantics.
Since Kripke’s semantics for modal logic gives us a formal meaning for true belief, we
are quite close to a formalization of Plato’s definition of knowledge: knowledge is justified
true belief. But while our interpretation of modal logic allows us to formalize the last two
components of Plato’s three-part definition, it falls short when we wish to formalize the first
component, justification. Let us see why.
Consider a formula of the form Kϕ ⊃ Kψ. Such a formula is a statement of conditional
knowledge that says my knowledge of ψ follows from my knowledge of ϕ. But notice that
while such a formula describes a connection between my knowledge of one thing and my
knowledge of another, the formula fails to provide a reason as to why this connection holds,
something we certainly want of our logical language if we are to say that this language
incorporates a notion of justification. It is thus more accurate for us to read the formula
Kϕ as “ϕ is known for some reason” because this formula merely asserts the existence of
knowledge—it does not say why we have this knowledge.
Justification Logic has recently been suggested as a means of remedying this shortcoming
[5, 6, 4, 12]. The basic language of Justification Logic extends the language of propositional
logic by introducing formula-labeling terms, allowing us to take a term t and a formula ϕ
and form the new formula t :ϕ. Terms can be nested, so in the formula t :ϕ, the formula
ϕ may itself contain terms. But the most important feature of terms is the fact that they
have a certain derivation-compatible structure: for each derivation D of a theorem ϕ (in a
later-defined system), we can construct a term t whose structure mimics that of D in such
a way that t :ϕ is also a theorem. This allows us to think of the term t as a particular
reason that explains why it is that ϕ is true. Justification Logic thus has a built-in notion
of justification that, when combined with a possible worlds semantics [2, 13, 3], again allows
us to capture true Hintikka-belief. Accordingly, we read t :ϕ as “ϕ is known for reason t.”
We then have a formalization of true belief in a logic with in-language justification, thereby
capturing all three components of Plato’s definition.
So far Justification Logic has only been used to model static situations of knowledge
(justified true belief). In this paper, we introduce public announcements into the language
of Justification Logic. A public announcement is a kind of truthful public communication
whose purpose is to create common knowledge among the hearers of the announcement.
Public announcements are a basic concept in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, an area that studies
communication and knowledge (true belief) by introducing various kinds of communication
into the language of modal logic [23]. Our paper is thus a first-step in merging the areas of
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Justification Logic and Dynamic Epistemic Logic.
Our task in this paper is to extend the language of Justification Logic so as to reason
about public announcements alongside knowledge (justified true belief). After we introduce
the syntax and semantics of of Justification Logic, we will define a notion of bisimulation for
this language. Bisimulation allows us to study how language expressivity is affected when
we introduce additional syntax to reason in the language about a given kind of communi-
cation such as public announcements. We will use our notion of bisimulation to show that
adding public announcements to the language of Justification Logic strictly increases lan-
guage expressivity, in contrast to the Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem, which shows that adding
public announcements to the language of modal logic does not increase language expressivity
[18, 15]. We will conclude by defining a natural extension for the language of Justification
Logic. This extension has the property that adding public announcements does not increase
language expressivity, and so this extension may be considered a Plaza-Gerbrandy analog of
modal logic that we can use to reason about justified true belief.
2 About Justification Logic
Justification Logic refers to a family of logics that have a certain close relationship with LP,
Artemov’s Logic of Proofs [7]. In this section we will define the syntax and semantics of LP
and its multi-modal extensions.
2.1 Syntax of Justification Logic
Definition 2.1 (LPP ). Let P be a set of propositional letters and let ⊥ be the propositional
constant for falsity. Then the language of LPP is given by the following grammar.
LPP is
{
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 | t :ϕ for p ∈ P
t ::= ci | xj | t1 + t2 | t1 · t2 | !t for i, j ∈ N
Some abbreviations for formulas: let ¬ϕ be ϕ ⊃ ⊥, let ϕ∧ψ be ¬(ϕ ⊃ ¬ψ), and let ϕ ≡ ψ be
(ϕ ⊃ ψ)∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ). For each i, j ∈ N, we call ci a constant and xj a variable. The constants
and variables make up the atomic terms, and (general) terms are formed according to the
grammar for t. The intended reading of t :ϕ is “ϕ is known for reason t.” We will omit the
superscript P in LPP , instead writing LP, when doing so ought not cause confusion.
Adding a finite number of modals to the language of LP gives us the language of Justifi-
cation Logic, JL.
Definition 2.2 (JLP,n). Let P be a set of propositional letters, let n be a positive integer, let
n̄ := {i ∈ N : i ≤ n}, and let ⊥ be the propositional constant for falsity. Then the language
of (n-agent) Justification Logic (over P ), written JLP,n, is given by the following grammar.
JLP,n is
{
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 | t :ϕ | Kiϕ for p ∈ P and i ∈ n̄
t ::= ci | xj | t1 + t2 | t1 · t2 | !t for i, j ∈ N
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The meanings of ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ≡ ψ, constant, variable, atomic term, and term are as in
Definition 2.1. The intended reading of Kiϕ is “ϕ is known to i for some reason.” We will
omit one or both of the P or n when writing JLP,n when doing so ought not cause confusion.
2.2 Theory for LP
Definition 2.3. The theory of LP consists of the following axiom schemes and rules of
inference.
• Classical propositional logic
A. A finite collection of axiom schemes for classical propositional logic
RA. Modus Ponens: infer ψ from ϕ ⊃ ψ and ϕ
• Evidence management
LP1. t : (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (s :ϕ ⊃ (t · s) :ψ)
LP2. t :ϕ ⊃ !t : (t :ϕ)
LP3. t :ϕ ⊃ (t+ s) :ϕ
s :ϕ ⊃ (t+ s) :ϕ
LP4. t :ϕ ⊃ ϕ
RLP. Constant Necessitation: infer c :A whenever c is a constant and A is an axiom
Let us now give informal readings for the axiom schemes for evidence management. LP1
says that if we have a reason t for an implication and a reason s for this implication’s
antecedent, then t · s is a reason for the consequent. So reasons are closed under Modus
Ponens using the ‘·’ operation.
LP2 says that if t is a reason for ϕ, then !t checks that t is indeed a reason for ϕ. So we
use the ‘!’ operation to verify our reasons.
LP3 says that if t is a reason for ϕ, then t + s and s + t are each reasons for ϕ. So the
operation ‘+’ allows us to combine reasons monotonically: t+ s is a reason for those things
for which one or both of t or s is a reason.
LP4 says that having a reason for ϕ is sufficient for ϕ to be true. This tells us that our
notion of evidence is quite strong, in that we cannot have a reason for something that is
false.
Finally, the rule of Constant Necessitation (RLP) says that constants are reasons for our
most basic facts, the axioms. Note that in the rule of Constant Necessitation, we infer c :A
whenever c is a constant c and A is an axiom, where A is any instance of the axiom schemes
A of classical propositional logic or of the axiom schemes LP1 through LP4 of evidence
management.
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Remark 2.4. The reader whose conscience was shocked by one or more of LP2 and LP4
may rest assured we can safely drop one or both of these schemes, yielding various weaker
notions of evidence [14].1
2.3 Theories for JLn
We study a number of theories for JLn, with the individual theory given by the choice
for each positive integer i ≤ n of a modal logic Λi that is to govern the behavior of the
modal Ki. For present purposes, we will choose Λi ∈ {K,T, S4, S5} for each positive integer
i ≤ n. In naming these theories, we will include “LP” in the name because each theory
will be defined as a certain conservative extension of the theory of LP. So for some example
theories: the theory LP(⊗ni=1S4) is the theory where each modal Ki is governed by S4; the
theory LP(⊗ni=1S5) is like LP(⊗ni=1S4), except that each Ki is S5; the theory LP(S4⊗ S5) is
the theory where n = 2, the modal K1 is S4, and the modal K2 is S5. Let us now give a
precise definition of such theories.
Definition 2.5 (LP,Ki). Let P be a set of propositional letters and let i be a positive integer.
The language LP,Ki is given by the following grammar.
LP,Ki is ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 | Kiϕ for p ∈ P
Definition 2.6 (Theory LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn)P ). Let P be a set of propositional letters and
let n be a positive integer. For each positive integer i ≤ n, let Λi ∈ {K,T, S4, S5} be in the
language LP,Ki . Then the theory LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn)P is given by the following axiom schemes
and rules of inference.
• The theory of LPP : the axiom schemes and rules of inference for LPP
• Fusion of {Λi}ni=1: for each positive integer i ≤ n, the axiom schemes and rules of
inference for Λi
• The Connection Principle: for each positive integer i ≤ n, the axiom scheme t :ϕ ⊃ Kiϕ
We may omit the superscript P when writing LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn)P when doing so ought not
cause confusion.
Informally, the Connection Principle says that if there is justified true belief for some-
thing, then each agent i has true belief of that something. Artemov and Antonakos have each
studied how this connection between reasons and knowledge gives us a notion of evidence-
based common knowledge [1, 3]. For present purposes, we may understand the Connection
Principle as a stipulation that the agents share a common source of trustworthy evidence.
Notice that in the theory LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), the rule of Constant Necessitation (RLP)
has us infer c :A from whenever c is a constant and A is an axiom, where A is an instance
1Note that if we drop LP2, then it is desirable to replace RLP with something stronger such as the
following schematic description of axioms: whenever A is an axiom and c is a constant, then c :A is also an
axiom. See [14, 4] for details.
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of an LP axiom scheme (whether a scheme A of classical propositional logic or a scheme
LP1 through LP4 of evidence management), an instance of an axiom scheme of Λi for any
positive integer i ≤ n, or an instance of the Connection Principle.
2.4 The Internalization Property
One of the most important properties of Justification Logic is the Internalization Property,
which is due to Artemov [7, 3].
Theorem 2.7 (Internalization [7, 3]). If ϕ is a theorem of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), then there is
a term t such that t :ϕ is also a theorem of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). The same also holds of the
theory LP.
Proof (from [7, 3]). By induction on the length of the derivation of ϕ in LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn). In
case ϕ is an axiom, then c :ϕ is a theorem by the rule of Constant Necessitation. Otherwise,
if ϕ is not an axiom, then the last step in the derivation of ϕ is Modus Ponens, Constant
Necessitation, or Necessitation of the modal Ki. We consider each case separately.
Suppose ϕ was derived by Modus Ponens from ψ ⊃ ϕ and ψ. It then follows from the
induction hypothesis that there are terms t and s such that both t : (ψ ⊃ ϕ) and s :ψ are also
theorems. Applying LP1, we have that (t · s) :ϕ is a theorem.
Suppose ϕ was derived by Constant Necessitation, so that ϕ is of the form c :A for an
axiom A. Then it follows from LP2 that !c : (c :A) is a theorem.
Suppose ϕ was derived by Necessitation of the modal Ki, so that ϕ is of the form Kiψ
for a theorem ψ. It then follows from the induction hypothesis that there is a term t such
that t :ψ is also a theorem, and thus !t : (t :ψ) is a theorem by LP2. Since t :ψ ⊃ Kiψ is an
instance of the Connection Principle, c : (t :ψ ⊃ Kiψ) is a theorem by Constant Necessitation
with constant c. Since c : (t :ψ ⊃ Kiψ) and !t : (t :ψ) are theorems, it follows from LP1 that
(c · !t) : (Kiψ) is a theorem, which completes the proof.
It is in the sense of the Internalization Theorem (Theorem 2.7) that we say Justification
Logic internalizes its proofs. Internalization makes precise our intuitive understanding of
terms as reasons (or evidence) for the formulas they label.
2.5 Possible Worlds Semantics
The possible world semantics for LP is due to Fitting [13]. Artemov extended this semantics
to LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) [2, 5, 6, 3].
Definition 2.8. A constant specification is a function C that maps each constant c to a
possibly empty set C(c) of formulas (in some fixed extension of the language of LP).
Definition 2.9. Let N = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ) be a Kripke model2 and let C be a constant
2So W is a nonempty set whose elements we call worlds, Ri is a binary relation on W for each positive
integer i ≤ n, and V is a valuation on (W, {Ri}ni=1), which is a function that assigns to each world Γ a possibly
empty set V (Γ) of propositional letters. To say that Γ is a world in the Kripke model (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ) means
that Γ ∈W .
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specification. An evidence function (based on N and C) is a function E that assigns to
each world Γ ∈ W and each term t a possibly empty set E(Γ, t) of formulas (in some fixed
extension of the language of LP) subject to the following restrictions.
• Evidence Closure
– Application. If ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ E(Γ, t) and ϕ ∈ E(Γ, s), then ψ ∈ E(Γ, t · s).
– Verification. If ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t), then t :ϕ ∈ E(Γ, !t).
– Sum. E(Γ, t) ∪ E(Γ, s) ⊆ E(Γ, t+ s).
– Constant Specification. C(c) ⊆ E(Γ, c) for each constant c.
• Evidence Monotonicity. If ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) and ΓRe∆, then ϕ ∈ E(∆, t).
Informally, E(Γ, t) is understood as the set of formulas for which t is admissible as evidence
at world Γ.3
Definition 2.10. Let N = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ) be a Kripke model and let C be a constant
specification. An (n-agent) Fitting model (based on C) is a tuple
M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re) ,
where E is an evidence function (based on N and C) and Re is a reflexive and transitive
binary relation on W such that
⋃n
i=1Ri ⊆ Re (that is, ΓRi∆ implies ΓRe∆ for each positive
integer i ≤ n). N is called the Kripke model underlying M . To say that Γ is a world in
a Fitting model M means that Γ is a world in the Kripke model underlying M . A pointed
(n-agent) Fitting model is a pair (M,Γ), where Γ is a world in the Fitting model M ; the
world Γ is called the point of (M,Γ). For a pointed Fitting model (M,Γ) and a formula
ϕ ∈ JLn, we will write M,Γ |= ϕ to mean that the formula ϕ is true at (M,Γ). The negation
of M,Γ |= ϕ is written M,Γ 6|= ϕ. Truth at a pointed Fitting model is defined by induction
on the construction of ϕ as follows.
• M,Γ |= p means that p ∈ V (Γ), where p is a propositional letter.
• M,Γ 6|= ⊥.
• M,Γ |= ψ ⊃ χ means that M,Γ |= ψ implies M,Γ |= χ.
• M,Γ |= Kiψ means that M,∆ |= ψ for each world ∆ in M satisfying ΓRi∆.
3To say that t is admissible (as evidence) for ϕ means that t is possible evidence for ϕ. Possible evidence
is not the same as actual evidence. If t is possible evidence for ϕ, then t may be taken into account when
considering the truth of ϕ. However, it need not be the case that t is itself sufficient to guarantee the truth
of ϕ, something we require of actual evidence. Thus the viewpoint of this paper is that (actual) evidence is
a rather strong notion because it is conclusive. This is not to say that weaker notions of evidence are not
of interest—it is just that weaker notions have only recently been addressed (see [14]) because Justification
Logic originated from proof-theoretic considerations (and a proof is quite a strong notion of evidence). See
Remark 2.4.
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• M,Γ |= t :ϕ means that both ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) and M,∆ |= ϕ for each world ∆ in M
satisfying ΓRe∆.
A Fitting model M is said to have a property P of binary relations (example: reflexivity) iff
each binary relation in the Kripke model underlying M has property P; a pointed Fitting
model (M,Γ) is said to have a property P of binary relations iff M has property P.
Validity for JL-formulas is defined relative to a class of pointed Fitting models (M,Γ)
such that the Kripke model underlying M has a structure appropriate for a fixed theory of
Justification Logic.
Definition 2.11. Let T be an extension of the theory LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn). The Kripke model
(W, {Ri}ni=1, V ) is said to be for the theory T exactly (W,Ri) is a frame for the logic Λi for
each positive integer i ≤ n. (To say that (W,Ri) is a frame for the logic Λi means that
each Λi-theorem is valid on the frame (W,Ri).) A Fitting model M based on the constant
specification C is said to be for the theory T exactly when we have both that the Kripke
model underlying M is for T and that A ∈ C(c) for each axiom A of T and for each constant
c. A pointed Fitting model (M,Γ) is said to be for the theory T iff M is for the theory T .
Examples for Definition 2.11: An n-agent Fitting model is for the theory LP(⊗ni=1S4) iff
the model is reflexive and transitive and the constant specification C on which the model’s
evidence function is based includes each LP(⊗ni=1S4)-axiom in C(c) for each constant c; an
n-agent Fitting model is for the theory LP(⊗ni=1S5) iff the model is reflexive, transitive, and
Euclidean and the constant specification C on which the model’s evidence function is based
includes each LP(⊗ni=1S5)-axiom in C(c) for each constant c; a two-agent Fitting model is for
the theory LP(S4 ⊗ S5) iff R1 is reflexive and transitive, R2 is an equivalence relation, and
the constant specification C on which the model’s evidence function is based includes each
LP(S4⊗ S5)-axiom in C(c) for each constant c.
Definition 2.12. Let T be an extension of LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn) and let ϕ be a JLn-formula. To
say that ϕ is valid (for T ) means that for each pointed Fitting model (M,Γ) for the theory
T , we have that M,Γ |= ϕ.
Theorem 2.13 (Fitting-Artemov [13, 2, 5, 6, 3]). For each Λ ∈ {K,T, S4, S5}, a formula
ϕ ∈ JLP,n is provable in LP(⊗ni=1Λ) if and only if ϕ is valid for LP(⊗ni=1Λ). Likewise, a
formula ψ in the language of LP is provable in LP if and only if ψ is valid for LP.
Corollary 2.14 ([13, 2, 5, 6, 3]). For each Λ ∈ {K,T, S4, S5}, the theory LP(⊗ni=1Λ) is a
conservative extension both of LP and of ⊗ni=1Λ.
2.6 Bisimulation for Justification Logic
We now define a notion of bisimulation for JL. Bisimulation allows us to study how language
expressivity changes when we introduce additional syntax to reason in the language about
a given kind of communication. We will use our notion of bisimulation later when we show
that public announcements add expressive power to JL.
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Definition 2.15. Given the Fitting model M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re), a world Γ ∈ W , and
a formula ϕ, to say that ϕ is knowable at Γ means that M,∆ |= ϕ for each ∆ ∈ W with
ΓRe∆.
Definition 2.16. Given Fitting models
M1 = (W1, {Ri}ni=1, V1, E1, Re) and M2 = (W2, {Si}ni=1, V2, E2, Se),
a nonempty binary relation B ⊆ (W1 ×W2) is a bisimulation between M1 and M2 exactly
when each of the following conditions hold.
• The frame bisimulation conditions:
For each binary relation R of M1 and S of M2 both sharing the same subscript:
1. If Γ1R∆1 and Γ1BΓ2, then there is a ∆2 ∈ W2 such that Γ2S∆2 and ∆1B∆2;
2. If Γ2S∆2 and Γ1BΓ2, then there is a ∆1 ∈ W1 such that Γ1R∆1 and ∆1B∆2.
• Agreement of propositional valuation: if Γ1BΓ2, then V1(Γ1) = V2(Γ2).
• Agreement of evidence for knowable formulas: if Γ1BΓ2 and ϕ is knowable at Γ1 or at
Γ2, then ϕ ∈ E1(Γ1, t) iff ϕ ∈ E2(Γ2, t) for each term t.
Two models are said to be bisimilar iff there exists a bisimulation between them. For pointed
Fitting models (M1,Γ1) and (M2,Γ2), the points Γ1 and Γ2 are said to be bisimilar iff there is
a bisimulation B between M1 and M2 satisfying Γ1BΓ2, in which case we write (M1,Γ1) 'B
(M2,Γ2). We may omit the subscript B when doing so ought not cause confusion.
Remark 2.17. By restricting to the case n = 0 in Definition 2.16, we obtain bisimulation
for formulas in the the language of LP itself.
What is new about Definition 2.16 is the condition for evidence agreement on knowable
formulas. While we could have defined bisimulation so that there is evidence agreement
for all formulas, this turns out to be too strong of a requirement because it obscures the
expressivity results we are able to obtain with this weaker notion of bisimulation. Regardless,
our notion of bisimulation is correct, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2.18. Let M1 and M2 be as in Definition 2.16. If (M1,Γ1) 'B (M2,Γ2) and
ϕ ∈ JLn, then M1,Γ1 |= ϕ iff M2,Γ2 |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the construction of ϕ. All cases are routine except the inductive case
for formulas of the form t :ϕ. We check this remaining case in detail, as follows. M1,Γ1 |= t :ϕ
means ϕ is knowable at Γ1 and ϕ ∈ E1(Γ1, t). By the induction hypothesis, Γ1BΓ2 implies
ϕ is knowable at Γ2 and, by the definition of bisimulation, we have ϕ ∈ E2(Γ2, t). Hence
M2,Γ2 |= t :ϕ. Interchanging the models M1 and M2 in this argument gives the converse.
We now give two examples of bisimilar models; each model which will be important for
later results in the paper. The reader may wish to skip over the examples until they are
later referenced.
9











Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of Fitting models M1 and M2 from Example 2.19.
Example 2.19. Let p be a propositional letter, let x be a variable, let W := {Γ,∆},
let Re := W × W , let Ri be a binary relation on W for each positive integer i ≤ n, let
V (Γ) := {p}, and let V (∆) := ∅. We will define evidence functions E1 and E2 so that the
Fitting models
M1 = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E1, Re) and M2 = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E2, Re)
are bisimilar, p ∈ E1(Γ, x), and p /∈ E2(Γ, x). We first specify E1 and E2 and then show that
M1 and M2 are bisimilar. See Figure 1 for a diagrammatic representation of these models.
Let E1 be the (unique) evidence function with the smallest graph such that p ∈ E1(Γ, x).
It then follows that ϕ /∈ E1(Γ, x) for any formula ϕ 6= p. We also have that E1(∆, t) = E1(Γ, t)
for all terms t.
For each w ∈ W and for each term t, E2 is defined as follows:
E2(w, t) =
{
E1(w, t) if t 6= x,
∅ if t = x.
It is not difficult to show that E2 is also an evidence function; most of the evidence function
properties follow immediately or else from the fact that E1 is itself an evidence function. It
is also clear that p /∈ E2(Γ, x).
M1 and M2 are clearly frame bisimulations and agree on their propositional valuations.
What remains is to show that they also satisfy the condition on agreement of evidence for
knowable formulas. So suppose that ϕ is knowable at Γ in M1. Certainly it cannot be the
case that ϕ is p, for p is not knowable at Γ in M1. Thus we have ϕ /∈ E1(Γ, x) because ϕ 6= p,
and we also have ϕ /∈ E2(Γ, x) because E2(Γ, x) = ∅. So, in the case t = x, the evidence
functions agree on the knowable formula ϕ. In case t 6= x, then we have E1(Γ, t) = E2(Γ, t)
by definition, so the evidence functions clearly agree on the knowable formula ϕ. The case
where ϕ is knowable at Γ in M2 is shown in the same way. A similar argument also applies
at the world ∆. Hence M1 and M2 are bisimilar.
Example 2.20. Let W := {Γ}, Re = {(Γ,Γ)}, let Ri be a binary relation on W for each
positive integer i ≤ n, and let V (Γ) := ∅. Let x be a variable. Then there are Fitting models
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M1 = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E1, Re) and M2 = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E2, Re)
such that M1 and M2 are bisimilar, ⊥ ∈ E1(Γ, x), and ⊥ /∈ E2(Γ, x); here ⊥ is the proposi-
tional constant for falsity. The construction of the evidence functions E1 and E2 is analogous
to that given in Example 2.19, as is the verification that M1 and M2 are bisimilar.
3 Expressivity
Expressivity is the comparative study of the propositions expressible in two languages sharing
a common semantics. The intuitive question this study attempts to answer is the following:
can one language say everything that the other language can say?
3.1 Expressivity Defined
Definition 3.1. Suppose I is a class of interpretations for languages L1 and L2, where we
write I |= ϕ for an interpretation I ∈ I and a formula ϕ ∈ (L1 ∪ L2) to mean that ϕ is
true under interpretation I. A translation function (from L1 to L2 over I) is a function
u : L1 → L2 mapping each formula ϕ ∈ L1 to a formula ϕu ∈ L2 such that for each formula
ψ ∈ L1 and each I ∈ I, we have I |= ψ iff I |= ψu.
Remark 3.2. Using the notation of Definition 3.1, a translation function u : L1 → L2
is typically defined by an induction on the depth of L1-formulas, where the notion of L1-
formula depth is defined so as to ensure that u : L1 → L2 is indeed a translation function
[23]. But notice that we do not require our translation functions to be so well-behaved. As
an example: a translation function could be non-computable.4
Definition 3.3 (L1 ↪→I L2). Suppose I is a class of interpretations for languages L1 and
L2 (as in Definition 3.1). Then we write L1 ↪→I L2 to mean that there exists a translation
function from L1 to L2. The negation of L1 ↪→I L2 is written L1 6↪→I L2. When writing
L1 ↪→I L2 or its negation, we will omit the subscript I when doing so ought not cause
confusion.
Remark 3.4. We may view ↪→I as a binary relation over the set L(I) of all languages L
such that for each L-formula ϕ and for each I ∈ I, we have exactly one of I |= ϕ and I 6|= ϕ.
It is easy to see that this relation is transitive and reflexive.
L1 ↪→ L2 means that L2 can express every proposition expressible by L1, which is our
formal understanding of the intuitive statement “L2 can say at least as much as L1 can say.”
Likewise, L1 6↪→ L2 means that L2 cannot express every proposition expressible by L1, which
is our formal understanding of the intuitive statement “L2 cannot say everything that L1
can say.”
4Rohit Parikh and Evan Goris both suggested the following well-known example of a necessarily non-
computable translation function. Take L1 to be the language of arithmetic and take L2 := {⊥,>}, where ⊥
is the propositional constant for falsity and > is the propositional constant for truth. Then let I := {N},
where N is the standard model of arithmetic. Since the validity problem for arithmetic is non-computable,
a translation function u : L1 → L2 is necessarily non-computable.
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Definition 3.5 (Relative Expressivity). Let I be a class of interpretations for the languages
L1 and L2 (as in Definition 3.1).
• L1 is more expressive (for I) than L2 iff both L1 6↪→I L2 and L2 ↪→I L1.
• L1 and L2 are equally expressive (for I) iff both L1 ↪→I L2 and L2 ↪→I L1.
• L1 and L2 are expressively incomparable (for I) iff both L1 6↪→I L2 and L2 6↪→I L1.
Example 3.6. Let P be a nonempty set of propositional letters, let ⊥ be the propositional
constant for falsity, and let I be the set of all truth assignments over P . We then define
three propositional languages according to the following grammars.
LP⊥⊃∧∨¬ is ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ for p ∈ P
LP⊥⊃ is ψ ::= q | ⊥ | ψ1 ⊃ ψ2 for q ∈ P
LP∧ is χ ::= r | χ1 ∧ χ2 for r ∈ P
Then we have LP⊥⊃∧∨¬ ↪→ LP⊥⊃ and LP⊥⊃ ↪→ LP⊥⊃∧∨¬, which means that LP⊥⊃∧∨¬ and LP⊥⊃ are
equally expressive. This is another way of saying that implication and falsity are sufficient
to express all formulas in the full language L⊥⊃∧∨¬ of propositional logic (over P ).
We also have that LP⊥⊃∧∨¬ 6↪→ LP∧ , and LP∧ ↪→ LP⊥⊃∧∨¬, which means that L
p
⊥⊃∧∨¬ is more
expressive than LP∧ . This is another way of saying that conjunction is not enough to express
the full language L⊥⊃∧∨¬ of propositional logic (over P ).
3.2 Proving Expressivity Results
To prove L1 ↪→ L2, it is typical to define a translation function u from L1 to L2 (Defini-
tion 3.1) by induction on the depth of L1-formulas, where the notion of L1-formula depth is
defined so as to ensure that u : L1 → L2 is indeed a translation function [18, 15, 9, 23, 17].
This, for example, is essentially how the results in Example 3.6 are typically proven in a
logic textbook [20]. Proving that L1 6↪→ L2 is usually a bit trickier.
Definition 3.7 (I1 ≡L I2). Suppose I1 and I2 are interpretations for language L. We write
I1 ≡L I2 to mean that for each formula ϕ ∈ L, we have I1 |= ϕ exactly when I2 |= ϕ.
Definition 3.8. If L is a language, then a function d : L→ N is called a depth function (for
L). If d : L→ N is a depth function for L, then for each k ∈ N, we define
Ld<k := {ϕ ∈ L : d(ϕ) < k} .
We will omit the d in Ld<k, instead writing L<k, when doing so ought not cause confusion.
The following lemma describes two methods for showing that L1 6↪→ L2 [9, 23, 17].
Lemma 3.9. Suppose that I is a class of interpretations for languages L1 and L2 (as in
Definition 3.1). Then each of the following statements implies L1 6↪→I L2.
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1. There is a formula ψ ∈ L1 and there are I, I ′ ∈ I such that I ≡L2 I ′, that I |= ψ, and
that I ′ 6|= ψ.
2. Suppose that d : L2 → N is a depth function for L2. Then there is a formula ψ ∈ L1
such that for each k ∈ N, we have I, I ′ ∈ I such that I ≡L<k2 I
′, that I |= ψ, and that
I ′ 6|= ψ.
Proof. We show each item implies L1 6↪→I L2.
1. Given a function u : L1 → L2, it follows from the assumption I ≡L2 I ′ that I |= ψu
iff I ′ |= ψu. Yet, by assumption, we have that I |= ψ and I ′ 6|= ψ. It therefore cannot
be the case both that I |= ψ iff I |= ψu and that I ′ |= ψ iff I ′ |= ψu, and so for the
formula ψ ∈ L1 it is not the case that I ′′ |= ψ iff I ′′ |= ψt for all I ′′ ∈ I. But then we
have shown that L1 6↪→I L2.
2. Given a function u : L1 → L2, there is a k ∈ N such that ψu ∈ L<k2 . We may then
apply the assumptions that I ≡L<k2 I
′, that I |= ψ, and that I ′ 6|= ψ as in Item 1 to
show that L1 6↪→I L2.
Remark 3.10. Suppose that I is a class of pointed models for a modal language L. Then
to show that (M,Γ) ≡L (N,∆) for (M,Γ) ∈ I and (N,∆) ∈ I, it is sufficient to show
that (M,Γ) and (N,∆) are bisimilar for L. So L-bisimulation is often used in Method 1 of
Lemma 3.9 to show that (M,Γ) ≡L (N,∆).
If d : L → N is a depth function for this modal language L (typically d counts the
maximum nested modal depth of L), then to show that (M,Γ) ≡L<k (N,∆) for some k ∈ N,
it is enough to show that (M,Γ) and (N,∆) are k-bisimilar for L. So finite L-bisimulation
[10] is often used in Method 2 of Lemma 3.9 to show that (M,Γ) ≡L<k (N,∆).
Making use of our notion of bisimulation for Justification Logic, we will apply Method 1
of Lemma 3.9 in order to show that adding public announcements to JL makes the language
more expressive (for the class of all pointed Fitting models).
4 Public Announcements
A public announcement of the formula ϕ operates on a possible worlds model by deleting all
those worlds in which ϕ does not hold [18, 15, 23]. The public announcement of ϕ should
be thought of as a truthful public communication that ϕ is the case, which has the intuitive
effect of making it common knowledge that the ¬ϕ worlds are inconsistent and so should
be eliminated from consideration. It is in this sense that the public announcement of ϕ
communicates the proposition ϕ to all the agents in an n-agent possible worlds model.
4.1 Public Announcements Defined
Public announcements appear as labeled modalities: [ϕ]ψ means that ψ holds after the public
announcement of ϕ. The intuitive reading of [ϕ]ψ is “ψ after announcing ϕ.”
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Definition 4.1 (L[]). If L is a language, then the language L with public announcements,
written L[], is the extension of L obtained by adding brackets (for formation of public
announcement formulas) and admitting an additional rule of formula formation for public
announcement formulas: if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then so is [ϕ]ψ.
We now define the truth of a public announcement formula in a Fitting model.
Definition 4.2. If Γ is a world in the Fitting model M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re), then
M,Γ |= [ϕ]ψ means that M,Γ |= ϕ implies M |ϕ,Γ |= ψ, where M |ϕ is the submodel of M
defined by ϕ. That is, if there is an Ω ∈ W such that M,Ω |= ϕ, then we define the model
M |ϕ as follows.
M |ϕ := (Wϕ, {Rϕi }ni=1, V ϕ, Eϕ, Rϕe )
where
• Wϕ := {∆ ∈ W : M,∆ |= ϕ}
• Rϕi := Ri ∩ (Wϕ ×Wϕ) for each positive integer i ≤ n
• V ϕ(∆) := V (∆) for each ∆ ∈ Wϕ
• Eϕ(∆, t) := E(∆, t) for each ∆ ∈ Wϕ and each term t
• Rϕe := Re ∩ (Wϕ ×Wϕ)
This definition also works for the public announcement of ϕ in a Kripke model M by omitting
both the evidence function E and the relation Re. We will write 〈ϕ〉ψ as an abbreviation for





The following correctness lemma follows by induction on the construction of JL-formulas.
Lemma 4.3 (Correctness). Let ϕ be a JL-formula. If there is a world Γ in a Fitting model
M such that M,Γ |= ϕ, then M |ϕ is a Fitting model.
Public announcements are so-named by way of analogy: if p is a propositional letter and
C is the common knowledge modal,5 then [p]Cp is valid; that is, after the announcement of
p, it is common knowledge that p is true. But this is only an analogy, since neither [ϕ]Cϕ
nor [ϕ]ϕ are valid for every formula ϕ in the language of modal logic.6 Nonetheless, formulas
ϕ for which [ϕ]ϕ is in fact valid will play a special role in the next section, so we provide
these formulas with a name.
Definition 4.4 ([22, 23]). Let T be a theory for a language L. To say that a formula ϕ ∈ L
is successful (for T ) means that the formula [ϕ]ϕ in the language of T [] is valid.
5The modal C behaves as reachability: M,Γ |= Cϕ means that ϕ holds at each world reachable from Γ
by a path in (
⋃n
i=1Ri)
∗, the reflexive transitive closure of
⋃n
i=1Ri.
6A well-known counterexample: p ∧ ¬K1p. See [22] for details.
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4.2 JL with Public Announcements
The Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem shows that adding public announcements to epistemic logic
does not make the language more expressive.7
Definition 4.5 (ELP,n). Let P be a set of propositional letters, let ⊥ be the propositional
constant for falsity, let n ≥ 1 be an integer, and let n̄ := {i ∈ N : i ≤ n}. The language of
(n-agent) epistemic logic (over P ), written ELP,n, is given by the following grammar.
ELP,n is ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 | Kiϕ for p ∈ P and i ∈ n̄
We will omit one or both of P or n when writing ELP,n when doing so ought not cause
confusion.
Theorem 4.6 (Plaza-Gerbrandy [18, 15]). ELP,n[] and ELP,n are equally expressive (for any
class of pointed Kripke models).
The following theorem shows that we cannot hope for a Plaza-Gerbrandy result for JL.
Theorem 4.7. Let P be a nonempty set of propositional letters. Then JLP,n[] is more
expressive than JLP,n for the class I of all pointed Fitting models.
Proof. That JLP,n ↪→I JLP,n[] is obvious. Now observe that for the models M1 and M2 of
Example 2.19, we have that (M1,Γ1) ' (M2,Γ2), from which it follows by Theorem 2.18
that (M1,Γ1) ≡JLP,n (M2,Γ2). But notice that M1,Γ1 |= [p]x :p and M1,Γ2 6|= [p]x :p for a
propositional letter p ∈ P . It follows by Method 1 of Lemma 3.9 that JLP,n[] 6↪→I JLP,n.
Corollary 4.8. Let P be a nonempty set of propositional letters. Then LPP [] is more
expressive than the language of LPP for the class of all pointed Fitting models.
Proof. Dropping the relations Ri and Si in the models M1 and M2 of Example 2.19 gives us
bisimilar Fitting models for LP, and so we may then follow the proof of Theorem 4.7.
As Evan Goris observed, the formula [p]x :p has an interesting interpretation, which we
explain by way of the following proposition.
Proposition 4.9 (Evan Goris, personal communication). Let Γ be a world in a Fitting
model M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re). Then for a propositional letter p, we have that
M,Γ |= [p]x :p iff
(
M,Γ |= p implies p ∈ E(Γ, x)
)
.
7The Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem breaks down in multi-agent epistemic logic with common knowledge
[9, 23], though public announcements are again definable if the language of epistemic logic with common
knowledge is extended by introducing a notion of relativized common knowledge [21, 23]. Whereas the




common knowledge is a binary modality Cr that behaves as restricted reachability: Cr(ϕ,ψ) holds iff ψ holds
in each world reachable from Γ via a path in (
⋃n
i=1Ri)
∗ whose worlds all satisfy ϕ. Then Cϕ ≡ Cr(>, ϕ) is
valid, and it can be shown that public announcements are definable in the extended language containing Cr
[21, 23].
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Proof. Suppose that both M,Γ |= [p]x :p and M,Γ |= p. It then follows from the definition
of truth of a public announcement in a pointed model that M |p,Γ |= x :p. This implies
p ∈ Ep(Γ, x) by the definition of truth of a formula of the form x :p. (Here Ep is as in
Definition 4.2.) But then p ∈ E(Γ, x) because Ep(Γ, x) = E(Γ, x) by definition.
Conversely, suppose M,Γ |= p implies p ∈ E(Γ, x). In the case M,Γ 6|= p, we have
M,Γ |= [p]x :p trivially, so assume M,Γ |= p and thus that p ∈ E(Γ, x). To see that
M |p,Γ |= x :p, it remains to be shown that p is knowable at Γ in M |p. But this follows
immediately: by our definition of the public announcement operation and the fact that p is
a propositional letter, we have that p holds at every world of M |p.
So JL with public announcements can describe evidence admissibility for certain formu-
las, though evidence admissibility is usually a strictly semantic notion. Noting that p is
successful, we are led to the following generalization of Proposition 4.9.
Theorem 4.10. Let P be a nonempty set of propositional letters and let Γ be a world in
a Fitting model M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re). If a formula ϕ is successful, then we have for
each term t that
M,Γ |= [ϕ]t :ϕ iff
(
M,Γ |= ϕ implies ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t)
)
.
Proof. M,Γ |= [ϕ]t :ϕ means that if M,Γ |= ϕ, then we have both that (a) ϕ ∈ Eϕ(Γ, t) and
also that (b) M |ϕ,∆ |= ϕ for each ∆ ∈ Wϕ with ΓRϕ∆. (Here Eϕ, Wϕ, and Rϕ are defined
as in Definition 4.2.) But M,Γ |= ϕ and ϕ successful together imply that M |ϕ,Ω |= ϕ
for all Ω ∈ Wϕ, which in particular implies (b). Since we assumed that M,Γ |= ϕ implies
ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) and we have that M,Γ |= ϕ also implies E(Γ, t) = Eϕ(Γ, t), then M,Γ |= ϕ and
ϕ successful together imply both (a) and (b), which gives us the desired result.
4.3 Letterless JL with Public Announcements
In the previous section, we considered expressivity for JLP,n with P 6= ∅. In this section we
look at expressivity for letterless JL.
Definition 4.11. For each language L introduced in this paper, there is a set P of propo-
sitional letters such that every L-formula contains propositional letters all in P ; we will say
that this P corresponds to L. Now to say that one of these in-paper languages L is letterless
means that for the P corresponding to L, we have that P = ∅. And to say that one of these
in-paper languages L is lettered means that L is not letterless.
Letterless JL formulas have a certain monotonicity property in reflexive Fitting models.
Lemma 4.12. Let Γ be a world in a reflexive Fitting model M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re).
Then for each ϕ ∈ JL∅,n, we have that M,Γ |= ϕ implies that M,∆ |= ϕ for all ∆ ∈ W with
ΓRe∆.
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Proof. By induction on the construction of JL∅,n-formulas. If such a formula ϕ contains
neither terms nor modals—so ϕ is in the language of letterless propositional logic—then
either ϕ or its negation is valid. So the base cases and inductive cases for Boolean connectives
are straightforward. The case for formulas of the form t :ψ follows by the meaning of truth for
formulas of this form combined with the property of Evidence Monotonicity for E . Finally,
suppose that M,Γ |= Kiχ, from which it follows by reflexivity that M,Γ |= χ. Applying
the induction hypothesis, we have that M,∆ |= χ for all ∆ ∈ W with ΓRe∆. Using the
transitivity of Re and the fact that Ri ⊆ Re, it follows that M,∆ |= Kiχ, as desired.
We now use the monotonicity property of Lemma 4.12 to show that public announcements
do not add expressive power either to letterless JL or to letterless LP for a certain class of
reflexive Fitting models.
Theorem 4.13. Define the function u : JL∅,n[] → JL∅,n by induction on formula construction
as follows:
⊥u := ⊥
(ϕ ⊃ ψ)u := ϕu ⊃ ψu




([ϕ]ψ)u := ϕu ⊃ ψu
Let I be the collection of all reflexive pointed Fitting models (M,Γ) such that for M =
(W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re), we have that E is compatible with u, which means that ϕ ∈ E(∆, t) iff
ϕu ∈ E(∆, t) for each ∆ ∈ W and each term t. Then JL∅,n[] and JL∅,n are equally expressive
for I. In addition, LP∅[] and LP∅ are equally expressive for I.
Proof. It suffices for us to show that u is a translation function. This amounts to proving
by induction on formula construction that for each ϕ ∈ JL∅,n[] and each (M,Γ) ∈ I, we have
that M,Γ |= ϕ iff M,Γ |= ϕu. We will handle only two of the inductive cases, leaving the
other cases to the reader.
Let us first show that M,Γ |= t :ψ iff M,Γ |= t :ψu. Notice that the induction hypothesis
implies that we have M,∆ |= ψ for all ∆ ∈ W with ΓRe∆ iff M,∆ |= ψu for all such ∆.
Since E is compatible with u, the result follows.
Let us now show that M,Γ |= [ψ]χ iff M,Γ |= ψu ⊃ χu. Now it follows from the induction
hypothesis that M,Γ |= ψ iff M,Γ |= ψu, so let us assume that M,Γ |= ψ iff we have that
M,Γ |= ψu. Applying Lemma 4.12 to our hypothesis M,Γ |= ψu, we have that M,∆ |= ψu
for all ∆ ∈ W with ΓRe∆ and thus thatM,∆ |= ψ for all such ∆ by the induction hypothesis.
But then
{∆ ∈ Wψ : ΓRψe ∆} = {∆ ∈ W : ΓRe∆} ,
and so the tree model generated from (M |ψ,Γ) is isomorphic to the tree model generated
from (M,Γ), from which it follows by a straightforward adaptation of a standard argument in
modal logic that (M |ψ,Γ) ≡JL∅,n (M,Γ).8 Since it follows from the induction hypothesis that
M |ψ,Γ |= χ iff M |ψ,Γ |= χu, it then follows from (M |ψ,Γ) ≡JL∅,n (M,Γ) that M |ψ,Γ |= χ
8See Proposition 2.6 in §2.1 of [10] for details on the standard argument.
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iff M,Γ |= χu. So we have shown that each of M,Γ |= ψ and M,Γ |= ψu individually implies
that we have M |ψ,Γ |= χ iff M,Γ |= χu, which means that M,Γ |= [ψ]χ iff M,Γ |= ψu ⊃ χu,
as desired.
We conclude this section with some results on the relative expressivity of various lettered
and letterless logics.
Theorem 4.14. Let P be a nonempty set of propositional letters and let I be the class of
all pointed Fitting models.
• LPP is more expressive than LP∅ for I.
• JLP,n[] is more expressive than JL∅,n[] for I.
• JLP,n[] is more expressive than JL∅,n for I.
• JLP,n[] is more expressive than LPP [] for I.
• JL∅,n is more expressive than LP∅ for I.
Proof. We prove the first three items simultaneously. For each language L appearing to
the left of “is more expressive than” in one of the first three items, let L′ be the language
appearing the the right of “is more expressive than” in that same item. Now it is clear that
we have L′ ↪→I L for each such pair (L,L′), so what remains is to show L 6↪→I L′.
Since P is nonempty, there is a propositional letter p ∈ P . Let W := {Γ}, let Ri be a
binary relation on W for each positive integer i ≤ n, let V1(Γ) := {p}, let V2(Γ) := ∅, let
Re := {(Γ,Γ)}, and let E be an evidence function based on (W, {Ri}ni=1, V1). Finally, define
the Fitting models
M1 := (W, {Ri}ni=1, V1, E , Re) and M2 := (W, {Ri}ni=1, V2, E , Re) .
Notice that (M1,Γ) ∈ I and (M2,Γ) ∈ I. It is not difficult to show by an induction on the
construction of L′-formulas that (M1,Γ) ≡L′ (M2,Γ) (notice that [ϕ]ψ ≡ (ϕ ⊃ ψ) is valid in
one-world Fitting models). But for the L-formula p, we have M1,Γ |= p and M2,Γ 6|= p, and
so L 6↪→I L′ by Method 1 of Lemma 3.9.
We now simultaneously prove the last two items, letting L be one of the languages to the
left of “is more expressive than” in one of the last two items and letting L′ be the language
to the right of “is more expressive than” in that same item. First, it is clear that L′ ↪→I L.
To see that L 6↪→I L′, we assume the notation from the previous paragraph. Now define
R11 := ∅ and R21 := {(Γ,Γ)}. We define the Fitting models N1 and N2 as follows:
N1 := (W, {R11} ∪ {Ri}ni=2, V2, E , Re)
N2 := (W, {R21} ∪ {Ri}ni=2, V2, E , Re)
Observe that (N1,Γ) ∈ I and (N2,Γ) ∈ I. It is not difficult to see by an induction on the
construction of L′-formulas that (N1,Γ) ≡L′ (N2,Γ). But notice that for the L-formula K1⊥,
we have N1,Γ |= K1⊥ and N2,Γ 6|= K1⊥, and so L 6↪→I L′ by Method 1 of Lemma 3.9.
Our expressivity results are summarized in Figure 2 (on Page 30).
18
5 Extending JL for Announcement Definability
While we have seen that public announcements do not add expressivity to letterless JL for
a certain class of reflexive Fitting models, public announcements do indeed add expressivity
to JL with propositional letters, so there is no hope for a Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem for JL
with propositional letters.
Our task of the present section is to extend the language JL in a way that brings the
language closer to its Fitting semantics. We will see that this extension, called E, has the
property that adding announcements does not increase language expressivity (for a certain
class of Fitting models), so this extension may be considered a Plaza-Gerbrandy analog of
modal logic, in the sense that we can reason about knowledge (justified true belief) in a
language in which public announcements are definable.
5.1 Syntax
Definition 5.1 (EP,n). Let P be a set of propositional letters, let n be a positive integer, let
n̄ := {i ∈ N : i ≤ n}, and let ⊥ be the propositional constant for falsity. Then the language
of EP,n is given by the following grammar.
EP,n is
{
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 | t :ϕ | Kiϕ | Jϕ | t ϕ for p ∈ P and i ∈ n̄
t ::= ci | xj | t1 + t2 | t1 · t2 | !t for i, j ∈ N
The meanings of ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ≡ ψ, constant, variable, atomic term, and term are as in
Definition 2.1. The intended reading of Jϕ is “ϕ is knowable” (see Definition 2.15), and
the intended reading of t  ϕ is “t is admissible (as evidence) for ϕ” (see the footnote on
Page 7). We will omit one or both of the P or n when writing EP,n when doing so ought not
cause confusion.
Definition 5.2. EP,0 is the language obtained from EP,n by deleting the rule of formula
formation for formulas of the form Kiϕ.
So EP,0 extends the language LPP by adding new formulas of the form Jϕ and t  ϕ
with the intent that t :ϕ ≡ Jϕ∧ (t ϕ), thereby allowing us to express the truth conditions
for the formula t :ϕ directly in the language.
5.2 Theories for En
As in the case of JLn, we will study a number of theories for En, with the individual theory
given by the choice for each positive integer i ≤ n of a modal logic governing the behavior
of the modal Ki. For present purposes, we will choose Λi ∈ {K,T, S4, S5} for each positive
integer i ≤ n. So for some example theories: the theory E(⊗ni=1S4) is the theory where each
modal Ki is governed by S4; the theory E(⊗ni=1S5) is like E(⊗ni=1S4) except that each Ki is
S5; the theory E(S4⊗ S5) is the theory where n = 2, the modal K1 is S4, and the modal K2
is S5. Let us now give a precise definition of such theories.
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Definition 5.3 (Theory E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn)P,n). Let P be a set of propositional letters and
let n be a non-negative integer. For each positive integer i ≤ n, let Λi ∈ {K,T, S4, S5} be a
in the language LP,Ki (Definition 2.5). Then the theory E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn)P,n is given by the
following axiom schemes and rules of inference.
• Classical propositional logic
A. Finite number of axiom schemes for classical propositional logic
RA. Modus Ponens: infer ψ from ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ψ
• Fusion of {Λi}ni=1: for each positive integer i ≤ n, the axiom schemes and rules of
inference for Λi
• S4 for the modal J
J1. J(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Jϕ ⊃ Jψ)
J2. Jϕ ⊃ JJϕ
J3. Jϕ ⊃ ϕ
RJ. J-Necessitation: infer Jϕ from ϕ
• Evidence admissibility
E1. (t (ϕ ⊃ ψ)) ⊃ (s ϕ ⊃ (t · s)  ψ)
E2. (t ϕ) ⊃ (!t (t :ϕ))
E3. (t ϕ) ⊃ ((t+ s)  ϕ)
(s ϕ) ⊃ ((t+ s)  ϕ)
E4. (t ϕ) ⊃ J(t ϕ)
RE. Infer c A whenever c is a constant and A is an axiom
• Connection principles
C1. a. t :ϕ ⊃ Jϕ
b. t :ϕ ⊃ (t ϕ)
c. (t ϕ) ⊃ (Jϕ ⊃ t :ϕ)
C2. Jϕ ⊃ Kiϕ for each positive integer i ≤ n
The theory of EP,0 is obtained by omitting both the fusion of {Λi}ni=1 and also the connection
principle C2. Naming convention: since the schemes C1a, C1b, and C1c are together
equivalent to t :ϕ ≡ Jϕ ∧ (t  ϕ), we will use the common name C1 when referring to
any one of these three schemes. We may omit one or both of the P or n when writing
E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn)P,n when doing so ought not cause confusion.
Note that the rule RE has us infer c  A whenever c is a constant and A is an axiom,
where A is an instance of a scheme A of classical propositional logic, an instance of an
axiom scheme of Λi for any positive integer i ≤ n, an instance of a scheme E1 through E4
of evidence management, or an instance of a connection principle C1 or C2.
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5.3 The Internalization Property
Like LP, the theory E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) also has the Internalization Property.
Theorem 5.4 (Internalization). If ϕ is a theorem of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), then there is a term
t such that t :ϕ is also a theorem of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn).
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of ϕ in E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). In case ϕ is
an axiom, then c ϕ is a theorem by RE and Jϕ is a theorem by J-Necessitation. It then
follows from C1 that c :ϕ is a theorem. In the case that ϕ is not an axiom, then the last
step in the derivation of ϕ is Modus Ponens, RE, J-Necessitation, or Ki-necessitation. We
consider each case separately.
Suppose ϕ was derived by Modus Ponens from ψ ⊃ ϕ and ψ. It then follows from the
induction hypothesis that there are terms t and s such that both t : (ψ ⊃ ϕ) and s :ψ are also
theorems. Applying C1, we have that both t  (ψ ⊃ ϕ) and s  ψ are theorems, and so
(t · s)  ϕ is a theorem by E1. Since J is S4, it follows from the theorems ψ ⊃ ϕ and ϕ
that Jϕ is a theorem. Applying C1 to the theorems (t · s)  ϕ and Jϕ, we then have that
(t · s) :ϕ is a theorem.
Suppose ϕ was derived by RE, which implies that ϕ is of the form c ψ for a constant
c and an axiom ψ. Applying E2, we then have that !c  (c :ψ) is a theorem. The formula
c :ψ ⊃ (c  ψ) is an instance of C1, so it follows by RE that d  (c :ψ ⊃ (c ψ)) is a
theorem for a constant d. Applying E1 to the theorems d (c :ψ ⊃ (c ψ)) and !c (c :ψ)
gives us the theorem (d · !c)  (c ψ). Applying J-Necessitation to the theorem c  ψ,
we obtain the theorem J(c  ψ), which we combine with the theorem (d · !c)  (c ψ)
using C1 to get the theorem (d · !c) : (c ψ).
Suppose ϕ was derived by J-Necessitation, which implies that ϕ is of the form Jψ for
a theorem ψ. By the induction hypothesis, there is a term t such that t :ψ is a theorem
and so t  ψ is a theorem by C1. Applying E2 to the theorem t  ψ, we obtain the
theorem !t (t :ψ). The formula t :ψ ⊃ Jψ is an instance of C1, so it follows from RE that
c (t :ψ ⊃ Jψ) is a theorem for a constant c. Applying E1 to the theorems c (t :ψ ⊃ Jψ)
and and !t  (t :ψ) gives us the theorem (c · !t)  (Jψ). Applying J-Necessitation to the
theorem Jψ implies that JJψ is a theorem. It then follows from the theorems (c · !t)  (Jψ)
and JJψ by C1 that (c · !t) : (Jψ) is a theorem.
Suppose ϕ was derived by Ki-Necessitation, which implies that ϕ is of the form Kiψ for
a theorem ψ. By the induction hypothesis, there is a term t such that t :ψ is a theorem, and
then our argument in the previous paragraph yields the theorem (c · !t)  (Jψ) for a constant
c. Since Jψ ⊃ Kiψ is an instance of C2, we have for a constant d that d  (Jψ ⊃ Kiψ)
is a theorem by RE. It follows from the theorems d  (Jψ ⊃ Kiψ) and (c · !t)  (Jψ) by
E1 that (d · (c · !t))  (Kiψ) is a theorem. By J-Necessitation of the theorem Kiψ, we have
that J(Kiψ) is a theorem. Combining the theorems (d · (c · !t))  (Kiψ) and J(Kiψ) using
C1 gives us the theorem (d · (c · !t)) : (Kiψ).
So our intuitive understanding of terms as reasons (or evidence) for the formulas they
label still works for the theory E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn).
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5.4 Possible World Semantics
En-formulas are interpreted in pointed n-agent Fitting models by extending the inductive
definition of truth in a pointed Fitting model to those formulas having one of the forms Jϕ
or t ϕ.
Definition 5.5. Let M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re) be an n-agent Fitting model. Truth of a
formula ϕ ∈ En at the pointed model (M,Γ) is given by combining the following inductive
cases with those in Definition 2.10.
• M,Γ |= Jψ means that M,∆ |= ψ for each world ∆ in M satisfying ΓRe∆.
• M,Γ |= t ψ means that ψ ∈ E(Γ, t).
For an extension T of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), to say that ϕ ∈ En is valid (for T ) means that for
each pointed Fitting model (M,Γ) for theory T , we have that M,Γ |= ϕ.
Theorem 5.6. Let P be a set of propositional letters and for each positive integer i ≤ n,
let Λi ∈ {K,T, S4, S5}. Then a formula ϕ ∈ EP,n is provable in E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) if and only
if ϕ is valid for E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn).
Proof. In this proof, all of our Fitting models are Fitting models for E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Λn). Now
an easy induction on the length of the derivation of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn)-theorems shows that
E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) is sound for pointed Fitting models: notice in particular that the axioms
and rule of evidence admissibility (E1–E4 and RE) are exactly the conditions on evidence
functions and that C1 ensures that t :ϕ ≡ Jϕ∧ (t ϕ). So let us focus on the completeness
argument.
To show that E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) is complete for Fitting models, we will give a canonical
model construction. Terminology: a set is a set of EP,n-formulas; the conjunction of a finite
set S, written
∧
S, is the conjunction of the formulas making up that set; a set Sc is consistent
iff there is no finite subset S ⊆ Sc such that
∧
S ⊃ ⊥ is provable in E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn); a
set is inconsistent iff it is not consistent; a consistent set is maximal iff adding any EP,n-
formula not already in the set would make the resulting set inconsistent. Any consistent
set can be extended to a maximal consistent set by a Lindenbaum argument (enumerate
through the formulas, adding a formula to the set iff doing so would not make the resulting
set inconsistent; after enumerating all formulas, the resulting set is maximal consistent). It
follows from that definition of maximal consistency that that each maximal consistent set
Γ satisfies the following properties: Γ contains every E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn)-theorem, Γ is closed
under RA (Modus Ponens), Γ is closed under RE, and Γ contains either ϕ or ¬ϕ for each
ϕ ∈ JLP,n. If Γ is a set, we define three subsets of Γ, as follows.
ΓKi := {ϕ : Kiϕ ∈ Γ}
ΓJ := {ϕ : Jϕ ∈ Γ}
Γt := {ϕ : t ϕ ∈ Γ}
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The canonical model for E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) is the tuple M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re) whose
components are defined as follows: W is the collection of all maximal consistent sets; for
each Γ,∆ ∈ W and each positive integer i ≤ n, we have ΓRi∆ iff ΓKi ⊆ ∆ and we have
ΓRe∆ iff Γ
J ⊆ ∆; we define V (Γ) := Γ ∩ P ; and for each Γ ∈ W and each term t, we define
E(Γ, t) := Γt. We must verify that the structure we just called the canonical model is in fact
a Fitting model. This verification requires us to check four items, which we now state and
prove in turn.
1. For each positive integer i ≤ n, the frame (W,Ri) is a frame for Λi, meaning that every
Λi-theorem is valid on (W,Ri).
(a) Case: Λi is K.
K is sound for the class of all Kripke frames.
(b) Case: Λi is T.
T is sound for the class of all reflexive Kripke frames, so it suffices for us to show
that Ri is reflexive. Suppose that Kiϕ ∈ Γ for some Γ ∈ W . Since Λi contains the
T-axiom for Ki, the formula Kiϕ ⊃ ϕ is a theorem of E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn). Therefore,
Kiϕ ⊃ ϕ ∈ Γ and hence ϕ ∈ Γ. So we have shown that ΓKi ⊆ Γ, which is what
it means to say ΓRiΓ. Thus Ri is reflexive.
(c) Case: Λi is S4.
S4 is sound for the class of all reflexive and transitive Kripke frames, so it suffices
for us to show that Ri is reflexive and transitive. The argument for reflexivity
is as in the previous case, so let us focus on transitivity. Suppose that ΓRi∆
and ∆RiΩ for some Γ,∆,Ω ∈ W . This means that ΓKi ⊆ ∆ and ∆Ki ⊆ Ω.
Now suppose that Kiϕ ∈ Γ. Since Λi contains the 4-axiom for Ki, the formula
Kiϕ ⊃ KiKiϕ is a theorem of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). Therefore, Kiϕ ⊃ KiKiϕ ∈ Γ
and hence KiKiϕ ∈ Γ. Since ΓKi ⊆ ∆ and ∆Ki ⊆ Ω, we then have ϕ ∈ Ω. Thus
ΓKi ⊆ Ω, which means that ΓRiΩ. Thus Ri is also transitive.
(d) Case: Λi is S5.
S5 is sound for the class of all reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean Kripke frames,
so it suffices for us to show that Ri is reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean. The
first two of these were shown above, so let us focus on the Euclidean property.
Suppose that ΓRi∆ and that ΓRiΩ, which means that Γ
Ki ⊆ ∆ and ΓKi ⊆ Ω.
Were it not the case that ∆RiΩ, then it would follow from the definition of Ri
that we would have Kiϕ ∈ ∆ with ϕ /∈ Ω. It would then follow by maximal
consistency that ¬ϕ ∈ Ω. Since ΓKi ⊆ Ω, it would follow that Kiϕ /∈ Γ. Applying
maximal consistency, we would have ¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ. Since Λi contains the 5-axiom
for Ki, the formula ¬Kiϕ ⊃ Ki¬Kiϕ is a theorem of E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn). Therefore,
¬Kiϕ ⊃ KiKiϕ ∈ Γ, from which it would follow that Ki¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ and thus
that ¬Kiϕ ∈ ∆ because ΓKi ⊆ ∆. But then we would have both Kiϕ ∈ ∆ and
¬Kiϕ ∈ ∆, contradicting the consistency of ∆. Therefore it must have been the
case that ∆RiΩ, and so Ri is indeed Euclidean.
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2. Re is reflexive and transitive.
Delete the first sentence from the case Λi = T and the first two sentences from the case
Λi = S4, combine the resulting paragraphs (in order), and then replace each occurrence





It suffices for us to show that ΓRi∆ implies ΓRe∆ for each Γ,∆ ∈ W . So suppose
that ΓRi∆, which means that Γ
Ki ⊆ ∆. To show that ΓJ ⊆ ∆, notice that since
Jϕ ⊃ Kiϕ is a theorem of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), we have that ΓJ ⊆ ΓKi ⊆ ∆ by the
maximal consistency of Γ and of ∆. Thus ΓRe∆, as desired.
4. E is an evidence function on (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ) for E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn).
By our definition of E , for a Γ ∈ W and a term t, we have that ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) iff t ϕ ∈ Γ.
So we see that the evidence function conditions follow almost immediately from the
axioms and rule for evidence admissibility (E1–E4 and RE). We thus provide detailed
arguments only for Application and Evidence Monotonicity.
(a) E satisfies the conditions of Evidence Closure.
• Application. If ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ E(Γ, t) and ϕ ∈ E(Γ, s), then ψ ∈ E(Γ, t · s).
ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ E(Γ, t) and ϕ ∈ E(Γ, s) mean that t (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∈ Γ and s ϕ ∈ Γ.
By E1 and the maximal consistency of Γ, it follows that (t · s)  ψ ∈ Γ,
which means that ψ ∈ E(Γ, t · s).
• Verification. If ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t), then t :ϕ ∈ E(Γ, !t). (Apply E2.)
• Sum. E(Γ, t) ∪ E(Γ, s) ⊆ E(Γ, t+ s). (Apply E3.)
• Constant Specification. C(c) ⊆ E(Γ, c) for each constant c. (Apply RE.)
(b) E satisfies the condition of Evidence Monotonicity: if ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) and ΓRe∆, then
ϕ ∈ E(∆, t).
ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) means that t ϕ ∈ Γ. By E4 and the maximal consistency of Γ, we
have J(t  ϕ) ∈ Γ. Since ΓRe∆ means that ΓJ ⊆ ∆, we then have t  ϕ ∈ ∆,
which means that ϕ ∈ E(∆, t), as desired
So the canonical model is indeed a Fitting model. What remains is for us to prove that the
canonical model satisfies the Truth Lemma: for each Γ ∈ W and for each ϕ ∈ JLP,n, we
have ϕ ∈ Γ iff M,Γ |= ϕ. We prove the Truth Lemma by induction on formula construction.
Since the base and Boolean inductive cases are straightforward, we focus on the remaining
inductive cases.
• Kiϕ ∈ Γ iff M,Γ |= Kiϕ.
Suppose Kiϕ ∈ Γ. If ΓRi∆, which means ΓKi ⊆ ∆, then ϕ ∈ ∆. By the induction
hypothesis, M∆ |= ϕ. Since we chose ∆ ∈ W satisfying ΓRi∆ arbitrarily, we have
shown M,Γ |= Kiϕ.
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Now suppose Kiϕ /∈ Γ. We claim that ΓKi ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. Were it not, then
there would be a finite subset {ψj : j ∈ I} ⊆ ΓKi , where I is a finite index set, such
that
∧
j∈I ψj ⊃ ϕ is provable in E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). Since Λi is normal, we would then
have that
∧
j∈I Kiψj ⊃ Kiϕ is provable in E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). Now {ψj : j ∈ I} ⊆ ΓKi
implies Kiψj ∈ Γ for each j ∈ I, so the maximal consistency of Γ would then give us∧
j∈I Kiψj ∈ Γ, from which it would follow that Kiϕ ∈ Γ, contradicting our assumption
Kiϕ /∈ Γ. Thus ΓKi ∪ {¬ϕ} is in fact consistent and so may be extended to a maximal
consistent ∆ ∈ W . We then have ΓKi ⊆ ∆ and thus that ΓRi∆. Since ¬ϕ ∈ ∆,
it follows from the induction hypothesis that M,∆ 6|= ϕ. We have thus shown that
M,Γ 6|= Kiϕ.
• Jϕ ∈ Γ iff M,Γ |= Jϕ.
Take the two paragraphs from the previous case and then replace each occurrence of
Ki with J and each occurrence of Ri with Re.
• t ϕ ∈ Γ iff M,Γ |= t ϕ.
t ϕ ∈ Γ means that ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t), which is the meaning of M,Γ |= t ϕ.
• t :ϕ ∈ Γ iff M,Γ |= t :ϕ.
M,Γ |= t :ϕ ≡ Jϕ ∧ (t  ϕ) follows by the meaning of truth in a pointed Fitting
model. Since t :ϕ ≡ Jϕ ∧ (t  ϕ) is also a theorem of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), the result
follows by the induction hypothesis.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. Now for completeness: if ϕ is not provable in
E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), then {¬ϕ} is consistent and so may be extended to a maximal consistent
set Γ ∈ W . By the Truth Lemma, M,Γ 6|= ϕ, which completes the proof.
Corollary 5.7 (Conservativity). For each positive integer i ≤ n, let Λi ∈ {K,T, S4, S5}.
Then E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) is a conservative extension of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn).
Proof. The proof follows almost immediately from the soundness of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) (The-
orem 5.6) and the completeness of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) (Theorem 2.13) once we have shown
that for each pointed Fitting model (M,Γ) for LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Λn), there is a pointed Fitting
model (M ′,Γ′) for E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) such that M,Γ |= ψ iff M ′,Γ′ |= ψ for each ψ in the
language of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). So we take up this task first.
Let M be a Fitting model for LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), where E is the evidence function in
M . An extension of E is any evidence function F based on the Kripke model underlying M
and satisfying F(Γ, t) ⊇ E(Γ, t) for all worlds Γ in M and for all terms t; we write F ⊇ E
whenever F is an extension of E . F ⊇ E is a nontrivial extension, written F ) E , iff there
is a world Γ in M and a term t such that F(Γ, t) ) E(Γ, t). To say that F ⊇ E is a minimal
(extension) having property P means that F has property P and that no G satisfying both
F ) G and G ⊇ E has property P. The intersection of a nonempty collection C of extensions
of E is the function
⋂




F∈C F(Γ, t) for each world Γ in
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M and each term t. It can be shown that the intersection of any nonempty collection of
extensions of E is itself an extension of E .
Let us now define a property P of evidence functions. The evidence function F is said
to have property P exactly when F ⊇ E and the Fitting model M(F) obtained from M
by replacing the evidence function E with the evidence function F is a Fitting model for
E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). It can be shown that the intersection E ′ of the class of all extensions of E
having property P is a minimal extension of E having property P. We let M ′ denote M(E ′).
It can be shown by induction on the construction of a formula ψ in the language of
LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) that M,Γ |= ψ iff M ′,Γ |= ψ. Verifying this fact boils down to proving
by induction on the construction of a term t that for every formula ϕ in the language of
LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), we have ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) iff ϕ ∈ E ′(Γ, t). The most difficult part of this is the
right-to-left direction, and it will be instructive for us to handle a few cases in detail.
So we are to show by induction on the construction of a term t that for each formula ϕ
in the language of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), we have that ϕ ∈ E ′(Γ, t) implies ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t).
• Base case: t is the constant c.
Suppose ϕ ∈ E ′(Γ, c). Since every axiom of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) that is not an axiom of
LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) is itself not in the language of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn), it cannot be the
case that ϕ is an axiom of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn). So ϕ ∈ E(Γ, c) then follows from the
minimality of E ′.
• Base case: t is the variable x.
It follows from the minimality of E ′ that E ′(Γ, x) = E(Γ, x).
• Inductive case: t is the term s1 · s2.
If for ψ ⊃ ϕ in the language of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) we have that ψ ⊃ ϕ ∈ E ′(Γ, t) and
that ψ ∈ E ′(Γ, s), then it follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ ⊃ ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t)
and that ψ ∈ E(Γ, s), from which we have ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t ·s) by the Application property of
evidence functions. So assume that for no ψ ⊃ ϕ in the language of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Λn)
do we have both ψ ⊃ ϕ ∈ E ′(Γ, t) and ψ ∈ E ′(Γ, s). By the minimality of E ′, we then
have that ϕ ∈ E ′(Γ, t) implies ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t).
The remaining inductive cases—where t is !s or s1 + s2—are quite similar to the case s1 · s2.
So we have hopefully convinced the reader of the following: for every pointed Fitting
model (M,Γ) for LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn), there is a pointed Fitting model (M ′,Γ) for E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn)
such that M,Γ |= ψ iff M ′,Γ |= ψ for every formula ψ in the language of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Λn).
With this result in hand, we proceed with the proof of conservativity.
Suppose ϕ is a theorem of E(Λ1⊗ · · · ⊗Λn) in the language of LP(Λ1⊗ · · · ⊗Λn). By the
soundness of E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) (Theorem 5.6), we have that ϕ is valid for E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn),
which means that ϕ is true in every pointed Fitting model for E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn). Now for any
pointed Fitting model (M,Γ) for LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) we may construct the pointed Fitting
model (M ′,Γ) for E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn) as above, and then ϕ is true at (M ′,Γ)—since ϕ is valid for
E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn)—which implies that ϕ is also true at (M,Γ) by what we proved above. So ϕ
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is also valid for LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn). By the completeness of LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn) (Theorem 2.13),
we then have that ϕ is a theorem of LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn).
5.5 Relative Expressivity of En[]
We now show that adding public announcements to the language of En does not increase
language expressivity (for a certain class of Fitting models), so En may be considered a
Plaza-Gerbrandy analog of ELn (Definition 4.5) that we can use to reason about justified
true belief via the theory E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn). Our method of proof will be to define by induction
on the depth of En[]-formulas a translation function u that assigns to each En[]-formula ϕ
an En-formula ϕu with the property that for a certain class of pointed Fitting models I, we
have M,Γ |= ϕ ≡ ϕu for each (M,Γ) ∈ I. So in order to proceed, we first introduce an
appropriate notion of depth for the language EP,n[].
Definition 5.8. For each term t, let |t| denote the number of symbols occurring in t. We
then define the depth function d : EP,n[] → N as follows.
d(p) := 1, for each p ∈ P
d(⊥) := 1
d(ϕ ⊃ ψ) := 1 + max{d(ϕ), d(ψ)}
d(t :ϕ) := 5 + |t|+ d(ϕ)
d(Kiϕ) := 1 + d(ϕ)
d(Jϕ) := 1 + d(ϕ)
d(t ϕ) := 1 + |t|+ d(ϕ)
d([ϕ]ψ) := (4 + d(ϕ)) · d(ψ)
It follows from the meaning of ϕ ∧ ψ (Definition 2.1) that
d(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 2 + max{d(ϕ), 1 + d(ψ)} .
In Definition 5.8, the integers 5 and 4 were chosen in order to obtain the following lemma,
whose proof is straightforward (though tedious).
Lemma 5.9. Let d be as in Definition 5.8. Then each of the following holds.
d(ϕ) > ψ, for each proper subformula ψ of ϕ
d(t :ϕ) > d
(





























































We may now show that adding public announcements to En does not increase language
expressivity over an appropriate class of Fitting models.
Theorem 5.10. Let P be a possibly empty set of propositional letters. Let d be as in
Definition 5.8. Define the function u : EP,n[] → EP,n by induction on d(ϕ) of ϕ ∈ EP,n[] as
follows.
pu := p, for each p ∈ P
⊥u := ⊥
(ϕ ⊃ ψ)u := ϕu ⊃ ψu





(t ϕ)u := t ϕu(
[ϕ]p
)u
:= ϕu ⊃ p, for each p ∈ P(
[ϕ]⊥
)u












)u ∧ ([ϕ](t ψ))u(
[ϕ]Kiψ
)u



















That this is a correct definition by induction follows from Lemma 5.9. Now let I be the
collection of all pointed Fitting models (M,Γ) such that for
M = (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re) ,
we have that E is compatible with u, which means that ϕ ∈ E(∆, t) iff ϕu ∈ E(∆, t) for each
∆ ∈ W and each term t. Then EP,n[] and EP,n are equally expressive for I.
Proof. It is sufficient for us to show that u is a translation function. To show this, we prove
by induction on d(ϕ) that for each (M,Γ) ∈ I, we have M,Γ |= ϕ ≡ ϕu. In case ϕu = ϕ,
the result is obvious, so we only need address the inductive cases where ϕu 6= ϕ. Many of
these cases are by now well-known [23], so we will only check those new cases introduced in
the present paper.
• Case: M,Γ |= (Jϕ) ≡ (Jϕ)u.
By the meaning of truth for formulas of the form Jϕ and the induction hypothesis, we
have M,Γ |= (Jϕ) ≡ (Jϕu) and thus that M,Γ |= (Jϕ) ≡ (Jϕ)u by the meaning of u.
• Case: M,Γ |= (t ϕ) ≡ (t ϕ)u.
By the meaning of truth for formulas of the form s ψ and the compatibility of E with
u, we have that M,Γ |= (t ϕ) ≡ (t ϕu) and thus that M,Γ |= (t ϕ) ≡ (t ϕ)u
by the definition of u.
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• Case: M,Γ |= (t :ϕ) ≡ (t :ϕ)u.
We have M,Γ |= (t :ϕ) ≡
(
Jϕ ∧ (t  ϕ)
)
by the definition of truth. Note that
(χ1 ∧ χ2)u is χu1 ∧ χu2 by the definition of u. Now we have seen in the two previous
cases that M,Γ |= (Jϕ) ≡ (Jϕ)u and that M,Γ |= (t ϕ) ≡ (t ϕ)u. It follows that
M,Γ |= (t :ϕ) ≡
(
Jϕ ∧ (t ϕ)
)u
.















by the definition of u. By the induction hypothesis, we have
M,Γ |= ϕ ≡ ϕu. Now in caseM,Γ 6|= ϕ andM,Γ 6|= ϕu, then the result follows trivially.
So let us assume both that M,Γ |= ϕ and that M,Γ |= ϕu. Then M,Γ |= [ϕ]Jψ is
equivalent to M |ϕ,Γ |= Jψ, which means that M |ϕ,∆ |= ψ for each ∆ ∈ Wϕ with
ΓRϕe∆. But notice that this is equivalent to M,∆ |= [ϕ]ψ for each ∆ ∈ W with ΓRe∆,
which, by the induction hypothesis, is itself equivalent to M,∆ |= ([ϕ]ψ])u for all




, which is equivalent




under our assumption M,Γ |= ϕu.











is ϕu ⊃ (t  ψu) by the definition of u. By the induction hypothesis,
we have M,Γ |= ϕ ≡ ϕu. Now in case M,Γ 6|= ϕ and M,Γ 6|= ϕu, the result follows
trivially. So let us assume both that M,Γ |= ϕ and that M,Γ |= ϕu. Then M,Γ |=
[ϕ](t  ψ) is equivalent to M |ϕ,Γ |= t  ψ, which means that ψ ∈ Eϕ(Γ, t). By
the definition of Eϕ (Definition 4.2), we have ψ ∈ E(Γ, t). By the compatibility of E
with u, we have that ψ ∈ E(Γ, t) is equivalent to ψu ∈ E(Γ, t), and the latter means
that M,Γ |= t  ψu. Since we assumed M,Γ |= ϕu, we have that M,Γ |= t  ψu is
equivalent to M,Γ |= ϕu ⊃ (t ψu).















[ϕ]Jψ ∧ [ϕ](t  ψ)
)
by the definition of truth. Note that



















We now compare the expressivity of our new language EP,n with that of JLP,n[], the latter
of which we already know to be more expressive than JLP,n for the class of all pointed Fitting
models (Theorem 4.7).
Theorem 5.11. Let P be a possibly empty set of propositional letters and let I be the class
of all pointed Fitting models.
• EP,n[] is more expressive than JLP,n[] for I.

















Figure 2. A summary of our expressivity results (with references) for each n ∈ N and each P 6= ∅. The
results hold for the class of all pointed Fitting models unless indicated by an ‘r’ (for the reflexive pointed
Fitting models) or a ‘c’ (for the pointed Fitting models compatible with a certain translation function—see
both the referenced result and Section 6 for details).
Proof. Consider the models M1 and M2 from Example 2.20. It is not hard to see that
(M1,Γ) ≡JLP,n[] (M2,Γ). This proof, by induction on the construction of JL
P,n[]-formulas,
is straightforward once we observe that [ψ]χ ≡ (ψ ⊃ χ) is valid in any one-world Fitting
model. But observe that for x  ⊥, which is both an EP,n[]-formula and an EP,n-formula,
we have M1,Γ |= x  ⊥ and yet M2,Γ 6|= x  ⊥. The result thus follows from Method 1
of Lemma 3.9. This proves the first item. The second follows by the same proof because
(M1,Γ) ≡JLP,n[] (M2,Γ) implies (M1,Γ) ≡JLP,n (M2,Γ).
We conclude this section with a theorem that reports the relative expressivity of various
lettered versions of E with their corresponding letterless versions. The proof of this theorem
is nearly identical to the proof of the first three items of Theorem 4.14.
Theorem 5.12. Let P be a nonempty set of propositional letters and let I be the class of
all pointed Fitting models.
• EP,n[] is more expressive than E∅,n[] for I.
• EP,n is more expressive than E∅,n for I.
• EP,n[] is more expressive than E∅,n for I.
We summarize our expressivity results in Figure 2.
6 Evidence Function Compatibility
Both for letterless JL and for E, we have seen that adding public announcements does not
increase language expressivity for a certain class of pointed Fitting models (one class for JL
and another class for E). We now wish to comment on the emphasized proviso in the previous
sentence.
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6.1 Choosing Unnatural Interpretations
Our discussion in Section 3 suggests that we align the meaning of the intuitive statement
“L1 and L2 express the same concepts” with the conjunction of L1 ↪→I L2 and L2 ↪→I L1
(Definition 3.5). But notice that whether L ↪→I L′ depends on the choice of a fixed class I
of interpretations. This choice can sometimes cause our formal notion of equally expressive
(Definition 3.5) to diverge from our informal understanding of what it means to “express the
same concepts.”
Example 6.1. Let P be a nonempty set of propositional letters. We define two propositional
languages according to the following grammars.
LP∨ is ψ ::= p | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 for p ∈ P
LP∧ is χ ::= q | χ1 ∧ χ2 for q ∈ P
Let I be the class consisting of the (two) truth assignments over P that assign a unique
truth value to every letter in P . Then LP∨ and L
P
∧ are equally expressive for I.
In Example 6.1, we chose a class I of interpretations relative to which the propositional
languages of conjunction and disjunction are equally expressive. So for this class of inter-
pretations, conjunction and disjunction “express the same concepts.” But this goes against
our intuition: disjunction and conjunction are different!
The problem, of course, is that we chose an “unnatural” class I of interpretations, which
then allows us to show that the the languages LP∨ and L
P
∧ , which intuitively express different
concepts, are nonetheless equally expressive. Said informally: we so severely limited the
concepts (that is, the propositions) about which these languages could form sentences that
the languages could then no longer describe the ways in which they differ.
So whether a formal result about equal expressivity corresponds to our intuitions about
“expressing the same concepts” depends on whether the class I of interpretations our intu-
itions would have us choose is the same as the class of interpretations chosen for the formal
result.
6.2 The Naturalness of Our Choices for JL
We now wish to discuss the naturalness of our choice of interpretations for our equal expres-
sivity result in Theorem 4.13 (on JL∅,n[] and JL∅,n) and for our equal expressivity result in
Theorem 5.10 (on EP,n[] and EP,n). It will be sufficient for us to restrict our comments to
the latter theorem.
Now in proving EP,n[] ↪→I EP,n in Theorem 5.10, we chose the class I in such a way that
for each (M,Γ) ∈ I, the evidence function E of M is compatible with the translation function
u : EP,n[] → EP,n, which means that ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) iff ϕu ∈ E(Γ, t) for each world Γ in M . This
compatibility was necessary in order to ensure that u is indeed a translation function: since




, the term t in the formula t  ϕ does not change when we
apply u to t  ϕ. Thus for us to have M,Γ |= t  ϕ iff M,Γ |= (t  ϕ)u, the evidence
function must be compatible with u.
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We might like to eliminate this requirement of evidence function compatibility and then
try to define a translation function u : EP,n[] → EP,n over the class of all pointed Fitting
models. Our discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that the trick might be to allow
u to change both t and ϕ when we apply u to t ϕ. Unfortunately, this trick cannot work.
Theorem 6.2. Let u : EP,n[] → EP,n be a function. There is no function f mapping each
term s and each formula ψ to a term f(s, ψ) such that for each pointed Fitting model (M,Γ),
for each formula ϕ ∈ EP,n[], and for each term t, we have
M,Γ |= t ϕ iff M,Γ |= f(t, ϕ)  (ϕu) .
Proof. Choose ϕ ∈ EP,n[] such that ϕu 6= ϕ (example: [⊥]⊥). Let W := {Γ}, let Ri := ∅
for each positive integer i ≤ n, let V (Γ) := ∅, and let Re := {(Γ,Γ)}. Let C be the empty
constant specification, which is defined by setting C(c) := ∅ for each constant c. Let E be
the evidence function based on N := (W, {Ri}ni=1, V ) and C such that E has the smallest
graph subject to the restriction that ϕ ∈ E(Γ, x) for the variable x. By induction on term
construction, we can show that for each term t and each ψ ∈ E(Γ, t), we have that ϕ is a
subformula of ψ. Since ϕ is not a subformula of ϕu, it follows that ϕu /∈ E(Γ, t) for each
term t. Now define the Fitting model M := (W, {Ri}ni=1, V, E , Re). Then for each term t, we
have that M,Γ |= x ϕ and yet M,Γ 6|= t (ϕu).
This leads us to the following theorem, which says that in order for u : EP,n[] → EP,n
to be a translation function from EP,n[] to EP,n over a nonempty class I of pointed Fitting
models, each (M,Γ) ∈ I must satisfy a certain general compatibility condition with respect
to u.
Theorem 6.3. Suppose u : EP,n[] → EP,n is a translation function over a nonempty class I of
pointed Fitting models. Then each (M,Γ) ∈ I satisfies the following condition of generalized
compatibility for u: if E is the evidence function of M , then we have that ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) iff
M,Γ |= (t ϕ)u for each formula ϕ ∈ EP,n[] and each term t.
Proof. M,Γ |= (t ϕ)u is equivalent to M,Γ |= t ϕ because u is a translation function.
By the definition of truth, M,Γ |= t ϕ means that ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t).
Corollary 6.4. Let f be a function mapping each term s and each formula ψ ∈ EP,n[] to
a term f(s, ψ) such that there is a translation function u : EP,n[] → EP,n over a nonempty
class I of pointed Fitting models that sets (t  ϕ)u := f(t, ϕ)  (ϕu) for each ϕ ∈ EP,n[].
Then each (M,Γ) ∈ I is compatible with u, which means that for the evidence function E of
M we have ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) iff ϕu ∈ E(Γ, f(t, ϕ)) for each term t and each formula ϕ ∈ EP,n[].
Proof. By Theorem 6.3, we have that ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) iff M,Γ |= (t  ϕ)u for the evidence
function E of an arbitrary (M,Γ) ∈ I. Since (t  ϕ)u := f(t, ϕ)  (ϕu), we have that
ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t) iff ϕu ∈ E(Γ, f(t, ϕ)) by the meaning of truth for the formula f(t, ϕ)  (ϕu).
So for a function u : EP,n[] → EP,n to be a translation function over a nonempty class I
of pointed Fitting models, (generalized) compatibility of each (M,Γ) ∈ I with u is required.
This tells us that our choice of I in Theorem 5.10 is quite natural.
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7 Conclusion
We began this paper by looking at a number of theories for Justification Logic. Using the
schematic name LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) for these theories, we recalled Artemov’s Internalization
Property : for each LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) theorem ϕ, there is a term t such that t :ϕ is also a
LP(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) theorem. Internalization was central to our understanding of terms as
reasons for the formulas they label, and, combined with Fitting’s possible world semantics
for Justification Logic, led us to the reading of t :ϕ as “ϕ is known for reason t.” These
considerations led us to suggest that LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn) is an appropriate theory for reasoning
about justified true belief.
After studying a notion of bisimulation for the language of Justification Logic, we in-
troduced public announcements, which are a form of truthful public communication. Using
our notion of bisimulation, we saw that adding public announcements to the language of
Justification Logic strictly increases language expressivity. This stands in contrast to the
Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem, which states that public announcements do not add expressivity
to the language of multi-modal logic, a language whose logics are used to reason about true
belief.
We then introduced the language E as an extension of the language of Justification Logic.
Using the schematic name E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn) for a conservative extension in the language E of
the theory LP(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn), we showed that adding public announcements to E(Λ1⊗· · ·⊗Λn)
does not increase language expressivity. It is in this sense that we said that the language
E is a Plaza-Gerbrandy analog of multi-modal logic. Since E(Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn) also satisfies
Internalization, we may again consider this theory appropriate for reasoning about justified
true belief.
Much of our work in the paper was spent studying the relative expressivity of various
letterless or lettered extensions of Justification Logic, both with and without public an-
nouncements. We summarized our results in Figure 2 on Page 30. We have also seen that
many of these expressivity results were given relative to a certain restricted class of pointed
Fitting models consisting of those models that are compatible with a given translation func-
tion. We saw at the end of the paper that this restriction was a necessary consequence of
our working with Justification Logic.
Stepping back a bit from the details of our work, this paper is really a first-step in a
larger project whose goal is to merge the areas of Justification Logic and Dynamic Epistemic
Logic. The latter is an area that generalizes public announcements to a broader class of
communications collectively called the BMS Updates [8, 19], though this work is done in a
language extending multi-modal logic. Thus the next step in our project is to generalize the
work in this paper to the case of BMS Updates. Such a generalization will provide us with
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